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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

RICHARD E. ASHBY
Plaintiff and Respondent
vs.

WHITING & HAYMO,ND
STRUCTION CO,MPANY,

CO~N

Case No. 9953

Defenda.nt and Appellant

BRIEF Of APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action for personal injuries and property
damage arising out of a collision between a pickup truck
driven by the plaintiff and an automobile driven by V erl
Justesen. Justesen was not the employee or agent of the
defendant Construction Company. He was not a party
to the lawsuit.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the court. It held the defendant
Construction Company liable for not replacing and maintaining a stop sign located at the intersection where the
accident occurred. From a judgment for the plaintiff,
defendant appeals.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment and judgment in its favor, as a matter of law, or that failing, a
new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following statement of facts views the evidence
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. It also includes the undisputed facts which favor the defendant.
For the purpose of identification the court record will be
referred to by HR" and the reporter's transcript by ((T".
At about 6:30 p.m. on Saturday, O.ctober 29, 1960,
the plaintiff was driving east in his 1955 Chevrolet pickup
on Highway U 100 (First North Street) in Fillmore, Utah.
(T9) The defendant construction company had been
working on Highway U 100 since September 1, 1960.
(T 12 3) . The project involved putting in a concrete ditch
to act as a dit.ch and curb and gutter on the north side of
the street, curb and gutter on the south side of the street,
and resurfacing the road and intersections from curb to
curb. (T 124). The defendant had taken down andreplaced the stop signs in order to complete the project. The
plaintiff had driven to work on Highway U 100 whenever it was open. (T 44) He had noticed the stop signs
were down at the intersection of Highway U 100 and
First, Second and Third West, except for the one on the
south side of Third West (T 43). He had seen equipment working in the area where the stop signs were (T
43). The plaintiff was driving with his lights on high
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beam then dimmed his lights for another vehicle coming
west on Highway U 100. (T 51). As the plaintiff approached the intersection of Highway U 100 and Second
West he passed the vehicle going west. (T 10) When
the plaintiff entered the intersection of Highway U 100
and Second West he did not remember that he looked to
the north. (T 49)

Q. That's what I am saying is, you were looking
straight ahead?
A. Yes.
Q. As you were going east and you did not look to
to the north?
A. No, not that I remember.
Q. Not that you can remember?
A. No. (T 48)
Plaintiff did not remember seeing anything before
the impact. (T 11). His vehicle was struck on the left side
by an automobile driven by Veri Justesen. (T 87) Justesen was proceeding south on Second West when he entered the intersection of Second West and Highway U 100
and struck the plaintiff's pickup between the cab and
the back fender (T 87). The pickup truck was rolled
over, the fenders and the bed were bent and the glass was
broken by the force of the impact. The front end of the
Plymouth driven by Justesen was all smashed. (T 87).
Tztstesen told Fillmore police officer, Merlin Hare, he ~vas
going 40 m.p.h. when he entered the intersection. (T. 90)
Justesen also told Officer Hare he had been drinking prior
to the collision. (T 97)
The automobile driven by Justesen left 25 feet of skid
marks commencing just south of the cross walk on the
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north side of the intersection of Highway U 100 and
Second West Street and continuing up to the point of
impact. The officer measured an additional 30 feet of
skid marks from the point of impact to where the Justesen
vehicle finally came to a rest. ( T 8 8, 91 )
There were no skid marks left by the plaintiff's truck
before the impact. (T 8 8) • The pickup truck skided 33
feet after the impact, then rolled over 50 feet before it
came to a rest. (T 95).

Verl Justesen had been driving a milk truck up and
down Highway U 100 every day for a period of time prior
to th'e accident. Officer Hare testified:

Q. You were acquainted with him (Veri Justesen)
at the time of this accident?
A. Right.
Q. And you know of your own knowledge that
he had been driving a truck up and down Highway U 100 prior to this accident?
A. That's right.
Q. Did he tell you for whom?
A. Floyd Killis' milk route.
Q. Did he have occasion because of his employment to drive this street every day?
A. Yes.
Q. That was for a period of time before the accident occurred?
A. Yes. Yes, that was prior to the accident.
Q. About how long had he lived in Fillmore prior
to this accident?
A. Well, I don't know for sure but I'd say at least
two or three years he had been in the area.
Q. Your testimony would be, then, that to the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

5

best of your knowledge, he traveled this street
during the period of construction?
A. Yes. (T 98)
Grant Palfreyman, construction foreman for defendant testified that when the construction crew moved into
the area of Second West and Highway U 100, the stop
sign on the Northwest corner of the intersection was
down. (T 125).
Each evening when the construction crew left the
area, Mr. Palfreyman propped the stop sign against a
uconstruction horse" and pla,ced it at the Northwest
corner of the intersection. (T 126-128)
Mr. Palfreyman testified the construction horse was
painted a safety yellow with reflectorized stripes which
were either red and white or black and white. There was
also a ttslow" sign approximately 2 foot square bolted to
the construction horse. (T 128)
During the day when the defendant's construction
crew was working, the construction horse and stop sign
were moved out of working area. (T 126)
It is undisputed that when Defendant's crew left

the job site em the evening of FrNlay, October 28, 1960,
the stop sign was rr toe-nailed" to a construction horse and
set on the nortbwest corner of the intersection of Highway
U 100 and Second West street. (T 126-127)
With regard to where the construction horse was
placed on the evening of October 28, 1960, Mr. Palfreyman testified:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6

nQ. And now, could you tell us approximately
where that sign was placed by yourself on that
night?
A. Approximately at the edge of the old cross walk
because we didn't have the oil laid out from the
intersection at that time. The oil was laid in a
strip about 60 feet wide down through the center
of the road from Highway 91 down to approximately Fifth West.
Q. And is it your recollection that the sign was
close to the cross walk, the old cross walk that went
across the street there?
A. That's right." (T 128)
Defendant's crew did not work on Saturday, October 29th
the day the accident happened. (T 144)
When defendant's crew returned to the job site on
Monday, October 31st a police officer of Fillmore City
rounded up a group of boys, had them get a tractor and
a wagon and bring hack some of the construction signs
which had been taken from the area. (T 127) One of the
signs returned w·as the stop sign for the northwest corner
of the intersection of Highway U 100 and Second West.
(T 127)
Trooper Gayle C. Rasmussen of the Utah Highway
Patrol testified that the normal reaction time for a driver
is one-half to three-fourths of a second, so that a driver
going 40 m.p.h. would travel 30 to 45 feet from the time
he observed the danger until he applied his brakes. (T 107).
Trooper Rasmussen testified that the stop sign on
t:he northwest corner of the intersection of Highway U
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100 and Second West was laying on the ground near a
mound of dirt after the accident (T 104). He also testified the stop sign had been down for several days prior
to the accident. (T 105)
Maxim P. Thornton, an employee of Fillmore City,
testified the stop sign had been down most of the week
before the accident. (T 66) Thornton did recall there
zuere construction horses at the intersections of First, Second and Third West and Highway U 100, but he could
not recall whether he saw the construction horse· on Saturday, October 29th or not. (T 69).
Everett Ashman who resides in the house on the
northwest corner of the intersection of Highway U 100
and Second West Street testified the stop sign at that
particular corner was down for about a week during the
latter part of October. (T 79-80) He remembered seeing
a rr construction-horse" by the culvert on the northwest
corner of the intersection of Second West and Highway
U 100 where the stop sign was. (T 80).
Defendant was unable_ to locate Verl Justesen at the
time of trial. He did not testify nor was he made a party
to the action. (R-1)
ARGU:MENT
POINT I
THE ABSENCE OF THE STOP SIGN (IF IT WAS
ABSENT) WAS NOT A CAUSE OF THE COLLISION
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Defendant respectfully submits that there is no evidence in the record to support a finding that it was
negligent. If the Court should hold the record does support such a finding, such negligence was not a proximate
cause of the accident. The proximate cause of this acci-·
dent was the negligence of Verl Justesen.
The record conclusively shows that Justesen knew
the area where the accident happened as he had been driving a milk truck up and down Highway U 100 every
day for some time prior to the accident. O;fficer Merlin
I-Iare testified that Justesen had traveled Highway U 100
during the period of the construction and was familiar
with the intersection.
The testimony of O-fficer Hare on this point is undisputed. Justesen must be charged with the knowledge
that the stop sign was removed the week before the accident so equipment coul~ work in the intersection, as he
drove the street every day. Justesen knew he was approaching a state highway as he drove south on Second
West Street. He knew he had the duty to yield the right
of way to vehicles traveling on the state highway.
The Utah Code Provides:
~~vehicle entering a through highway.-The
driver of a vehicle shall stop as required by this act
at the entrance to a through highway and shall
yield the right of way to other vehicles which have
entered the intersection from said through highway or which are approaching so closely on said
through highway as to constitute an immediate
hazard but said driver having so yielded may pro-
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ceed and the drivers of all other vehicles approaching the intersection on said through highway shall
yield the right of way to the vehicle so proceeding
into or across the through highway." (U.C.A. 1953
41-6-74) (Italics ours)

If the stop sign had been up, it would not have given
Justesen any more warning of the highway or of the
plaintiff's vehicle than he already had.
In Haarstrich v. Oregon Short LineR. Co. 70 Utah
552, 262 Pac. 100, (Utah 1927) this court was confronted with facts similar to the instant case. In that
case the plaintiff a guest passenger in an automobile,
claimed the defendant, railroad was negligent for failin1-{
to have proper signals at the crossing in North Salt Lake.
The plaintiff was injured when the automobile in which
she was riding collided with a freight train at the crossing
around 1:15 a.m. The evidence disclosed that the driver
of the automobile had a clear view of the train for 15 0
feet or more yet he failed to see it until it was too late
to avoid the collision. The jury returned a verdict in favor
of the plaintiff and the defendant appealed. The Supreme
Court reversed holding the negligence of the Railroad
company in not complying with the law as to warnings
and signals, was not a proximate cause of the accident.
The question on appeal was whether the negligence
of the defendant, if any, was a proximate cause of the
injury sustained by the plaintiff. The court held it was
not, stating:
((The street lights were functioning, and there
appears to have been no reason whatever why he
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could not have stopped his car and avoided the
collision if he had looked ahead and applied his
brakes at the proper time. In view of the indubitable facts disclosed by the evidence, it is wholly

immaterial whether the defendant strictly complied with the law as to warnings and signals. Its
failure in that regard, if there was a failure, which
is very doubtful, had nothing whatever to do with
the accident and was in no sense the proximate
cause of the plaintiff's injury." (Italics ours)
In the instant case, the fact that the stop sign was
down has no bea·ring whatsoever on the cause of the plaintiff's injuries. Justesen knew he was approaching a highway from a secondary road and he saw the plaintiff's
vehicle on the highway. His negligence in failing to yield
the right of way was the proximate cause of the accident.
In Hillyard v. Utah By-Products Co. 1 Utah 2d 143,
263 P.2d 287 (Utah 1953) this court announced the rule
that where one has negligently created a dangerous condition and a later actor observed or circumstances are
such that he could not fail to observe such condtion, but
negligently failed to avoid it, then as a matter of law the

later intervening act interrupts the natural sequence of
events and cuts off the legal effect of the negligence of
the initial actor.
In Tmna v. Utah Power f5 Light Co. 12 Utah 2d 278,
365 P.2d 788 (Utah 1961); and Velasquez v. Greyhound
Lines, 12 Utah 2d 379, 366 P.2d 989 (Utah 1961), this
court held that where the later actor knew of the condition
created by the prior actor, but negligently failed to avoid
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it, the negligence of the later actor cut off the prior negligence and became the sole proximate cause of the ac-cident.

In the Toma case an action was brought by the administratrix of the Estate of Fred R. Shook, Jr. against
the Utah Power & Light Company alleging Shook was
killed because of the negligence of the defendant. With
regard to the matter of proximate cause, the evidence
proved that the deceased's employer knew that the defendant's power lines were energized at the tim of the pouring
of cement. The deceased's employer failed to take any
acts to have the power cut off. Shook was electrocuted
when a crane lowering a bucket into a truck he was driving, came into contact with a cchot" wire.
This Court stated:
ttExamining the facts of the case at bar in light
of this case, we observe the Mountain States Con-

struction Company knew the involved wires were
live at the time of the pouring of cement on the
south side September 5, 1956. Mr. Waldren testified he had been told power would not be cut off.
Thus, even though the Utah Power & Light Company had negligently created a dangerous situation,
and negligently continued to maintain such a condition by refusing to cut off the power, the Mountain States Construction Company did have knowledeg of such condition and failed to avoid the
impending disaster. On the contrary the Mountain
States Construction Company put into motion the
actions which created the accident. It is not that
the Mountain States Construction Company failed
to observe a dangerous condition until too late to
avoid it. In fact the Mountain States Construction
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Company knew of the condition for four days."
(Italics outs)

* * *
((While we attach no particular significance to
the plaintiff's pull, we do believe and so hold, :f.rom
plaintiff's own evidence, that as a matter of law
the negligence of the Mountain States Construction
Company as hereinbefore set out was the sole proximate cause of the accident. So holding, the judgment of the District COurt is affirmed. Costs to
respondent."
A directed verdict in favor of the defendant was
sustained by the Su prerne Court.
In the Velasquez case supra, an a.ction was brought
for injuries sustained by a passenger on a bus which collided with the rear of a semi trailer stopped on the side
of the highway. The action was brought against the bus
company and the owner of the semi trailer.
The evidence disclosed that the driver of the semi
trailer stopped his truck at night to help another motorist
with approximately 7 feet of the trailer protruding on
to the traveled portion of an interstate highway. The
truck's clearance lights, stop lights and blinker lights were
on when the truck driver alighted. The Greyhound bus
driver admitted he saw the truck as he· approached. He
said he intended to stop behind the truck to render assistance and to add the benefit of his lights to the scene. The
evidence disclosed the bus driver lost consciousness by
either falling to sleep or blacking out from some other
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cause. He was aroused to consciousness by the cry of a
woman passenger ((Don't hit it". He swerved the bus
but not in time to avoid hitting the left rear comer of the
tntck.
The question on appeal was whether the negligence
of Greyhound was the sole proximate cause of the injury
or whether the prior par king of the truck so as to partially
obstruct the lane of traffic was a concurring proximate
cause of the collision.
The court stated:
ccln determining whether the negligence in creating
a hazard (Interstate's parking the truck ) was
aproximate cause of the collision, this is the test
to be applied: did the wrongful act, in a natural
and continuous sequence of events which might
reasonably be expected to follow, produce the injury. If so, it can be said to be a concurring proxiate cause of the injury even though the later
negligent act of another (Greyhound) cooperated
to cause it. On the other hand, if the latter's act
of negligence in causing the collision was of such
character as not reasonably to be expected to
happen in the natural sequence of events, then
such later act of negligence is the independent,
intervening cause and therefore the sole proximate
cause of the injury.
((Applying the foregoing test to our situation: we
think it is not reasonably to be foreseen that an
oncoming driver (Greyhound) would see (or fail
to see) this large, well-lighted truck so parked
upon the highway, and with at least one and onehalf usable traffic lanes to his left nevertheless run
into it. The trial court was correct in so concluding
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and entered a judgment in favor of Interstate
Motor Lines as a matter of law on the ground that
the negligence of Greyhound was the sole proximate cause of the collision."
The fact that the Greyhound bus driver saw the
truck then failed to avoid it resulted in his negligence being
the sole proximate cause of the accident.
Defendant respectfully submits that these two recent
Utah cases are persuasive authority that defendant's negligence, if any, was not a proximate cause of this accident
Justesen knew that he was entering an intersection yet
he failed to slow down or take any action to avoid the
collision until it was too late. He admitted to Officer
Hare that he was going 40 m.p.h. in a 20 m.p.h. zone when
he entered the intersection. Justesen's reckless conduct in
racing into the intersection at 40 m.p.h. conclusively
shows he had no intention of obeying any stop sign. To
say that Justesen would have seen the stop sign and slowed
down is to completely ignore the physical facts of this
case. Such reasoning is based on pure speculation. Justesen
saw the plaintiff's vehicle when he was at least 70 feet
from the point of imp:act (T 106) If he had been driving
at a reduced speed he could have brought his vehicle to
a stop within a reasonable distance, and stopped before
the impact.
Justesen's own knowledge of the intersection, coupled with his actual knowledge of the plaintiff's vehicle
on the highway gave him more warning than he would
have received from the stop sign. He knew of the danger
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then recklessly failed to avoid it. His conduct in speeding
into the intersection was the sole proximate cause of this
collision. It completely cuts off any prior negligence
of this defendant.

POINT II.
THE UNCONTROVERTED EVIDENCE SHOWS
THE DEFENDANT WAS NO·T NEGLIGENT
The undisputed testimony conclusively shows that
on Friday evening October 28, 1960, when defendant's
construction crew left the job on Highway U 100, that
the stop sign was ((toe-nailed" to a construction horse and
placed on the northwest corner of the intersection of Highway U 100 and Second West Street. Defendant's evidence
stands uncontradicted on this fact.
Grant Palfreyman, defendant's construction foreman
testified:

Q. Now directing your attention to the last weekend in October which was the weekend just before
Halloween do you recall if on the night of Friday,
October 28 what you did if anything with regard
to the stop sign on the intersection on the north
side of Second West and U-100?
A. I put them all in place against these horse construction barricades before I left the project.
Q. When you put them against the construction
horses, did you prop them up or nail them or what
did you do with them?
A. Sometimes toe-nailed them through the two
by fours. (T 126-127)
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There is no evidence which contradicts the fact that the
stop sign was in place when the defendant's crew left the
a·rea.
It is elementary that the plaintiff cannot recover
unless he can show that the defendant was negligent and
that such negligence was a proximate cause of his injury.
Mortensen v. First Securty Bank of Utah, 12 Utah 2d 89,
363 P. 2d 75 (Utah 1961).
The fact that the stop sign was seen down on the
ground on Saturday evening O·ctober 29, some 24 hours
after defendant left the area, is not evidence that the sign
was left down on Friday evening O·ctober 28th. Mere
proof of the existence of a present condition generally does
not raise any presumption that the same condition existed
at a prior date.
The rule stated in 31 C.J.S. p 789 Sec. 140 relating
to past and future existence of a fact or condition is as
follows:
HAs a general rule mere proof of the existence of
a present condition or state of facts or proof of
the existence of a condition or state of facts at a
given time, does not raise any presumption that
the same condition or facts existed at a prior date,
since inferences or presumptions of fact ordinarily
do not run backward.
Also in 20 Am. Jur. Sec. 210 the rule is stated as
follows:
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"Retrospective Operation of Presumption. The
presumption of the continued existence of a person,
a personal relation, or a state of things is prospective and not retrospective. Such a presumption
never runs backwards; the law does not presu1ne,
from the proof of the existence of present conditions or facts, that the same facts or conditions had
existed for any length of time previously. Thus,
proof of insanity at a particular time is not competent to prove, on the principle of natural and
probable relation, the same condition a considerable period prior thereto." (Italics Ours)
In Russell, Poling C$ Co. v. Conners Standard Marine
Corp. 252 F. 2d 167 (Second Circuit 1958) the Court
held that proof that two channel buoys were out of position the day after the plaintiff's barge was punctured by
a sunken object, did not raise any presumption that the
buoys were out of position on the day of the accident.
When the buoys were found off position, they still were
attached to their chains and anchors. No proof was offered as to the actual cause of the moving of the buoys,
but there was evidence that buoys were often moved by
tugs whose tow lines foul the chain of the buoys and
drag the buoys off position. The Court stated:
uAppellants challenged the ruling of the Trial
Court by asserting that a prior condition may be
inferred from a state of facts subsequently established. Generally, mere proof of the existence of
a state of facts does not raise a presumption that
the same condition of facts existed at a prior date,
since inferences or presumptions of fact ordinarily
do not run backward."
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In Sloan v. Caroline Power and Light Co. 102 S. E.
2d 822, (North Carolina 1958) the Supreme Court of
North Carolina held that evidence of the clearance between
telephone wires and power wires after the plaintiff's decedent was electrocuted was not evidence of the distance
of separation before the accident. The Court held:
((Conceding that a factual situation once
proven is presumed to continue in existence unless
there is proof to the contrary, the existence of a
condition at the time of an accident is not presumed to have existed prior thereto, and particularly when the accident resulted from an operation
that the evidence tends to show changed the condition and that such change was the proxmate cause
of the injury or one of the proximate causes thereof. Any inference or contention that the telephone
wires were in the same location or condition before
the accident as they were afterwards, must be
predicated on evidence of such location or condition prior to the accident. The general rule in this
·respect is stated in 31 C.J.S. Evidence Sec. 140,
p. 789, as follows: (As a general rule mere proof
of the existence of a present condition or state of
facts or proof of the existence of a condition or
state of facts at a given time, does not raise any
presumption that the same condition or facts existed at a prior date, since inferences or presumptions of fact ordinaTily do not run backward.'
Likewise, in the case of Liverpool & London &
Globe Ins. Co. of Liverpool, England v. Nebraska
Storage Warehouses, 8 Cir., 96 F. 2d 30, 36, it is
said: (... that while a given condition, shown to
exist at a given time, may be presumed to have
continued, there is not, on the other hand, any
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presumption that it existed previous to the time
shown."
Plaintiff cannot rely on a retrospective inference to
prove defendant's negligence. As was stated in Sloan v.
Carolina Power and Light Co. supra.
((Negligence on the part of the defendant, as a
general rule, is never presumed but is a matter for
affirmative proof.... the presumption is in favor
of innocence· or performance of duty and against
the existence of negligence, and in the absence of
affirmative proof it will be presumed that defendant or his servants were not guilty of negligence but exe·rcised due care with respect to the
thing or condition which caused the accident."
Plaintiff's witness who testified the stop sign was
down during the last week in October corroborated the
defendant's evidence to the effect that the stop sign was
moved out of the working area during the day. This
evidence does not raise an inference that the stop sign was
not put up Friday night when defendant's crew left the
area.
The record clearly shows that defendant used reasonable care in tttoe-nailing" the stop sign on the construction
horse and placing it on the northwest corner of the intersection. This was done on Friday evening, O·ctober
28th. The plaintiff did not contend nor does the law
require that the defendant place a guard at the construction site to see that signs are not removed.
The defendant's construction crew did not return
to Fillmore until Monday October 31st. On that morning
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all of the signs. were returned to the construction area by
some high school boys. There is no evidence in the record
as to when the signs were taken down except that it was
sometime after Friday evening, O~ctober 28th.
There was no evidence from which the Court could
find defendant negligent. The evidence in the record
clearly shows that defendant used reasonable care in placing the stop sign on the Northwest corner of the intersection when its crew left the construction area.

CONCLUSION
The record conclusively shows that the defendant
was not negligent.
It is undisputed that on Friday evening October 28,
1960, when defendant's construction crew left the job
in Fillmore, the stop sign was ((toe-nailed" to a construction horse on the Northwest corner of the intersection of
Highway U 100 and Second West.
The absence of the stop sign on Saturday evening,
October 29th was not a cause of the accident between the
plaintiff and Verl Justesen. Justesen knew he was approaching a highway and saw the plaintiff's car. His
reckless conduct in speeding into the intersection was the
sole proximate cause of the accident.
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The judgment of the lower court should be reversed
and judgment entered for defendant as a matter of law,
or defendant should have a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,

RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
STEPHEN B. NEBEKER

Attorneys for Defendant
and Appellant
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